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Duxbury Neil. The Nature and Authority of Precedent - Cambridge University Press, 2008. — 206 p. Download
КНИГИ З ПРАВА | | СКАЧАТЬ КНИГУ 26.03.2018, 07:59
прецендент Neil Duxbury examines how precedents constrain legal decision-makers and how legal decision-makers relax and avoid those constraints. There is no single principle or theory which explains the authority of precedent but rather a number of arguments which raise rebuttable presumptions in favour of precedent-following. This book examines the force and the limitations of these arguments and shows that although the principal requirement of the doctrine of precedent is that courts respect earlier judicial decisions on materially identical facts, the doctrine also requires courts to depart from such decisions when following them would perpetuate legal error or injustice. Not only do judicial precedents not ‘bind’ judges in the classical-positivist sense, but, were they to do so, they would be ill suited to common-law decision-making. Combining historical inquiry and philosophical analysis, this book will assist anyone seeking to understand how precedent operates as a common-law doctrine
Додав: egege | Контактна особа: правознавець | Теги: судовий прецедент, прецедент, теорія держави і права
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CONTENTS

Preface page ix Table of cases xii
1 Introduction: the usable past 1 1. Precedent 1 2. Positivism and precedent 14 3. A theory of precedent? 22
2 Why does English law have a doctrine of precedent? 31 1. The formation of a doctrine of precedent 31 a. The ambiguous role of classical legal positivism 37 b. Precedent and reason 48
3 Precedents as reasons 58 1. Looking for a certain ratio 67 a. The complexity of case-law 68 b. Definitions and tests 76 c. The point of the search 90 2. Shortcuts to reason 92 3. Pre-emptive precedent? 99 4. Conclusion 108
4 Distinguishing, overruling and the problem of self-reference 111 1. Distinguishing 113 2. Overruling 116 3. The power to overrule oneself 122 4. The authority of the Practice Statement 129 a. Constitutional impropriety 131 b. ‘Believe me, I always lie’ 139
5 Why follow precedent? 150 1. Consequentialist justifications 153 2. Deontological arguments 167 3. Conclusion 182
Index 184

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